Which power allows the Supreme Court to invalidate acts of the other branches if they contradict the principles of Constitution?

No.

Overruling Decision

Date of Overruling Decision

Overruled Decision(s)

Date of Overruled Decision(s)

Operative Language

1

The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443

1851

The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825)

1837

1825

It is the decision in the case of The Thomas Jefferson which mainly embarrasses the Court in the present inquiry. We are sensible of the great weight to which it is entitled. But at the same time we are convinced that if we follow it, we follow an erroneous decision into which the Court fell when the great importance of the question as it now presents itself could not be foreseen, and the subject did not therefore receive that deliberate consideration which at this time would have been given to it by the eminent men who presided here when that case was decided.

2

Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 79

U.S. (12 Wall.) 457

1871

Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603

1870

In so holding, we overrule so much of what was decided in Hepburn v. Griswold, as ruled the acts unwarranted by the Constitution so far as they apply to contracts made before their enactment.

3

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168

1881

Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204

1821

We must, therefore, hold, notwithstanding what is said in the case of Anderson v. Dunn, that the resolution of the House of Representatives finding Kilbourn guilty of contempt, and the warrant of its speaker for his commitment to prison, are not conclusive in this case, and in fact are no justification, because, as the whole plea shows, the House was without authority in the matter.

4

In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443

1887

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738

1824

We insist that this court has repeatedly overruled the announcement made in that case that "the Eleventh Amendment which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution over suits against the State, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in which a State is a party on the record."

5

Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642

1914

Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625

1896

Holding this view, notwithstanding our reluctance to overrule former decisions of this court, we now are constrained to hold that the technical enforcement of formal rights in criminal procedure sustained in the Crain Case is no longer required in the prosecution of offenses under present systems of law, and so far as that case is not in accord with the views herein expressed it is necessarily overruled.

6

United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591

1916

Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488

1905

We recognize that a different construction was placed upon § 6 of the act of 1887 in Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488, but after reexamining the question in the light of other provisions in the act and of many later enactments clearly reflecting what was intended by Congress, we are constrained to hold that the decision in that case is not well grounded, and it is accordingly overruled.

7

Pa. R.R. Co. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6

1917

Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684

1899

True it is that it may not be possible to reconcile these views with all that is said in the opinion delivered for the majority of the court in the case of Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith.... The views therein expressed with are inconsistent with the right of the States to fix reasonable commutation fares when the carrier has itself established fares for such service, must be regarded as overruled by the decision in this case.

8

Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529

1922

Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (1906); Doyle v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1877)

1906

1877

It follows that the cases of Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co. ... and Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt ... must be considered as overruled and that the views of the minority judges in those cases have become the law of this court.

9

Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203

1925

Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68

1913

So far as the language of Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts ... tends to support a different view it conflicts with conclusions reached in later opinions and is now definitely disapproved.

10

Farmers Loan & Tr. Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204

1930

Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903)

1903

Blackstone v. Miller no longer can be regarded as a correct exposition of existing law; and to prevent misunderstanding it is definitely overruled.

11

Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123

1932

Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142

1928

The affirmance of the judgment in the instant case cannot be reconciled with the decision in Long v. Rockwood ... upon which appellant relies, and in view of the conclusions now reached upon a re-examination of the question, that case is definitely overruled.

12

W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300

U.S. 379

1937

Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)

1936

1923

Our conclusion is that the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital ... should be, and it is, overruled.

13

Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376

1938

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285

U.S. 393 (1932); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922)

1932

1922

We are convinced that the rulings in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, supra, and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. ... are out of harmony with correct principle and accordingly they should be, and they now are, overruled.

14

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64

1938

Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1

1842

In disapproving that doctrine [i.e., that of Swift], we do not hold unconstitutional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other Act of Congress.

15

Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466

1939

New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871)

1937

1871

Collector v. Day, supra, and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, supra, are overruled so far as they recognize an implied constitutional immunity from income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or a state government or their instrumentalities.

16

O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277

1939

Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920)

1925

1920

[T]he meaning which Evans v. Gore imputed to the history which explains Article III, § 1, was contrary to the way in which it was read by other English-speaking courts. The decision met wide and steadily growing disfavor from legal scholarship and professional opinion. Evans v. Gore itself was rejected by most of the courts before whom the matter came after that decision ...

But to the extent that what the Court now says is inconsistent with what was said in Miles v. Graham ... the latter cannot survive.

17

Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83

1940

Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935)

1935

Appellant relies upon Colgate v. Harvey as a precedent to support his argument that the present statute is not within the limits of permissible classification and violates the privileges and immunities clause. In view of our conclusions, we look upon the decision in that case as repugnant to the line of reasoning adopted here. As a consequence, Colgate v. Harvey must be and is overruled.

18

Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141

1940

Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540

1902

Connolly's case has been worn away by the erosion of time, and we are of opinion that it is no longer controlling.

19

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100

1941

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)

1936

The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled.

20

United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul

& Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592

1941

United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903)

1919

1903

The case has often been cited as authority for the settled doctrine that an authorized taking of property for public use gives rise to an implied promise to pay just compensation. But we think this Court has never followed it as a binding decision that compensation is due for injury or destruction of a riparian owner's property located in the bed of a navigable stream. And we think that, so far as it sanctions such a principle, it is in irreconcilable conflict with our later decisions and cannot be considered as expressing the law.

21

Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236

1941

Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350

1928

The drift away from Ribnik v. McBride ... has been so great that it can no longer be deemed a controlling authority.

22

Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1

1941

Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928)

1936

1928

So far as a different view has prevailed, see Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox ...; Graves v. Texas Co...., we think it no longer tenable.

23

Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657

1942

Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567

1926

The Wachovia case should be and now is overruled and the constitutional power of New York to levy the present tax is sustained.

24

State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174

1942

First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312

1932

For the reasons stated, we do not think that First National Bank v. Maine should survive. We overrule it.

25

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.

287

1942

Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562

1906

Haddock v. Haddock is overruled.

26

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943)

(re-argument)

1943

Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)

1942

For the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court in the Murdock case and in the dissenting opinions filed in the present cases after the argument last term, the Court is of opinion that the judgment in each case should be reversed.

27

Okla. Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598

1943

Childers v. Beaver, 270 U.S. 555

1926

Childers v. Beaver ... was in effect overruled by the Mountain Producers decision.

28

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624

1943

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.

586

1940

The decision of this Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and the holdings of those few per curiam decisions which preceded and foreshadowed it are overruled ...

29

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649

1944

Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45

1935

Grovey v. Townsend is overruled.

30

Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183

1947

David Lupton's Sons v. Auto. Club of Am., 225 U.S. 489

1912

Cases like Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club ... are obsolete insofar as they are based on a view of diversity jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins ...

31

Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343

1948

Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14

1903

On its facts, the Andrews case presents variations from the present situation. But insofar as the rule of that case may be said to be inconsistent with the judgment herein announced, it must be regarded as having been superseded by subsequent decisions of this Court.

32

Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw.

Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525

1949

Coppage v. Kansas 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)

1915

1908

This Court beginning at least as early as 1934, when the Nebbia case was decided, has steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases. In doing so it has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law.

33

Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342

1949

Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Barnsdall Refineries, Inc., 296 U.S. 521 (1936); Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U.S. 549 (1919); Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U.S. 503 (1918); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522 (1916); Choctaw, Okla. & Gulf R.R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U.S.

292 (1914)

1936

1919

1918

1916

1914

In the light of the broad groundings of the Mountain Producers decision and of later decisions, we cannot say that the Gipsy Oil, Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions remain immune to the effects of the Mountain Producers decision and others which have followed it. They "are out of harmony with correct principle," as were the Gillespie and Coronado decisions and, accordingly, they should be, and they now are, overruled.... Moreover, since the decisions in Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison ... and Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma ... rest upon the same foundations as those underlying the Gipsy Oil, Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions, indeed supplied those foundations, we think they too should be, and they now are, overruled.

34

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56

1950

Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948)

1948

1948

To the extent that Trupiano v. United States ... requires a search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case is overruled.

35

Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382

1952

Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905); St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870)

1906

1905

1870

Under the earlier view governing the taxability of vessels moving in the inland waters (St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423; Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409; cf. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299), Ohio, the state of the domicile, would have a strong claim to the whole of the tax that has been levied. But the rationale of those cases was rejected in Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, where we held that vessels moving in interstate operations along the inland waters were taxable by the same standards as those which Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, first applied to railroad cars in interstate commerce. The formula approved was one which fairly apportioned the tax to the commerce carried on within the state. In that way we placed inland water transportation on the same constitutional footing as other interstate enterprises

36

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495

1952

Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230

1915

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n ... is out of harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer adhere to it.

37

Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408

1955

Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145

1932

Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Commission ... departed, however, from the Clapper decision.

38

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1

1957

Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956)

1956

1956

The two cases were consolidated and argued last Term and a majority of the Court, with three Justices dissenting and one reserving opinion, held that military trial of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert for their alleged offenses was constitutional.... Subsequently, the Court granted a petition for rehearing ... Now, after further argument and consideration, we conclude that the previous decisions cannot be permitted to stand. We hold that Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert could not constitutionally be tried by military authorities.

39

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416

1957

Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551

1913

Petitioner claims that this case is governed by Thompson v. Thompson ... For the reasons given in a concurring opinion in Armstrong v. Armstrong, ... the Thompson case, insofar as it held that an ex parte divorce destroyed alimony rights, can no longer be considered controlling.

40

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17

1960

United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214

1876

The District Court relied primarily on United States v. Reese.... As we have indicated, that decision may have drawn support from the assumption that if the Court had not passed on the statute's validity in toto it would have left standing a criminal statute incapable of giving fair warning of its prohibitions. But to the extent Reese did depend on an approach inconsistent with what we think the better one and the one established by the weightiest of the subsequent cases, we cannot follow it here.

41

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206

1960

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383

1914

[R]eason and experience ... point to the rejection of [the Weeks] doctrine.

42

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

1961

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25

1949

It, therefore, plainly appears that the factual considerations supporting the failure of the Wolf Court to include the Weeks exclusionary rule when it recognized the enforceability of the right to privacy against the States in 1949, while not basically relevant to the constitutional consideration, could not, in any analysis, now be deemed controlling.

43

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

1963

Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455

1942

Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable, we think the Betts v. Brady holding if left standing would require us to reject Gideon's claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel. Upon full reconsideration we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.

44

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726

1963

Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590

1917

Not only has the philosophy of Adams been abandoned, but also this Court almost 15 years ago expressly pointed to another opinion of this Court as having "clearly undermined" Adams.

45

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1

1964

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549

1964

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Colegrove opinion contended that Art. I, § 4, of the Constitution 7 had given Congress "exclusive authority" to protect the right of citizens to vote for Congressmen, but we made it clear in Baker that nothing in the language of that article gives support to a construction that would immunize state congressional apportionment laws which debase a citizen's right to vote from the power of courts to protect the constitutional rights of individuals from legislative destruction, a power recognized at least since our decision in Marbury v. Madison….

46

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6

1964

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)

1947

1908

We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States. Decisions of the Court since Twining and Adamson have departed from the contrary view expressed in those cases.

47

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52

1964

Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487

(1944); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931);

1944

1931

We have now overruled Feldman and held that the Federal Government may make no such use of the answers.... We reject—as unsupported by history or policy—the deviation from that construction only recently adopted by this Court in United States v. Murdock ... and Feldman v. United States ... We hold that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law.

48

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368

1964

Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156

1953

Stein v. New York is overruled.

49

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184

1964

Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583

1883

In our view, however, Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court.

50

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478

1964

Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958)

1958

1958

In any event, to the extent that Cicenia or Crooker may be inconsistent with the principles announced today, they are not to be regarded as controlling.

51

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400

1965

West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258

1904

In the light of Gideon, Malloy, and other cases cited in those opinions holding various provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the statements made in West and similar cases generally declaring that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the States can no longer be regarded as the law.

52

Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663

1966

Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937)

1937

Breedlove v. Suttles sanctioned its use as "a prerequisite of voting." To that extent the Breedlove case is overruled. (Internal citation omitted.)

53

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

1966

Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958)

1958

1958

In accordance with our holdings today and in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) are not to be followed.

54

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511

1967

Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961)

1961

We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled, that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it.

55

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589

1967

Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485

1952

Indeed, that theory was expressly rejected in a series of decisions following Adler.... We proceed then to the question of the validity of the provisions of subdivision 1 (c) of § 105 and subdivision 2 of § 3022, barring employment to members of listed organizations. Here again constitutional doctrine has developed since Adler.

56

Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253

1967

Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44

1958

Perez v. Brownell is overruled.

57

Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294

1967

Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 1921

1921

The premise in Gouled that government may not seize evidence simply for the purpose of proving crime has likewise been discredited.

58

Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523

1967

Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360

1959

Having concluded that Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be overruled, we reverse.

59

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

1967

Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)

1942

1928

We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.

60

Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39

1967

Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953)

1955

1953

Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinions in Kahriger... and Lewis... now suffices to preclude petitioner's assertion of the constitutional privilege as a defense to the indictments under which he was convicted. To this extent Kahriger and Lewis are overruled.

61

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123

1968

Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232

1957

We have concluded, however, that Delli Paoli should be overruled. We hold that, because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We therefore overrule Delli Paoli ...

62

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145

1968

Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581

1900

Maxwell held that no provision of the Bill of Rights applied to the States—a position long since repudiated—and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent a State from trying a defendant for a noncapital offense with fewer than 12 men on the jury.

63

Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378

1968

Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199

1952

In view of the Nardone and Benanti decisions, the doctrine of Schwartz v. Texas cannot survive the demise of Wolf v. Colorado ...

64

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392

U.S. 409

1969

Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1

1906

The conclusion of the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment irreconcilable with the position taken by every member of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases and incompatible with the history and purpose of the Amendment itself. Insofar as Hodges is inconsistent with our holding today, it is hereby overruled.

65

Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814

1969

MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281

1948

MacDougall v. Green is overruled.

66

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444

1969

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357

1927

Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California ... cannot be supported, and that decision is therefore overruled.

67

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752

1969

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947)

1950

1947

Rabinowitz and Harris have been the subject of critical commentary for many years, and have been relied upon less and less in our own decisions. It is time, for the reasons we have stated, to hold that on their own facts, and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with those that we have endorsed today, they are no longer to be followed.

68

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784

1969

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319

1937

For the same reasons, we today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Insofar as it is inconsistent with this holding, Palko v. Connecticut is overruled.

69

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436

1970

Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464

1958

The doctrine of Benton v. Maryland ... puts the issues in the present case in a perspective quite different from that in which the issues were perceived in Hoag v. New Jersey.... The question is no longer whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy.

70

Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323

1970

Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284

1910

While the Brantley holding may have had some vitality at the time the Georgia courts rendered their decisions in this case, it is no longer a viable authority and must now be deemed to have been overruled by subsequent decisions of this Court.

71

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78

1970

Thompson v. Utah 170 U.S. 343

1898

This Court's earlier decisions have assumed an affirmative answer to this question. The leading case so construing the Sixth Amendment is Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).... The defendant's new trial proceeded under Utah's Constitution, providing for a jury of only eight members. This Court reversed the resulting conviction, holding that Utah's constitutional provision was an ex post facto law as applied to the defendant. In reaching its conclusion, the Court announced that the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the defendant's trial when Utah was a Territory, and that the jury referred to in the Amendment was a jury "constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor less."

72

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637

1971

Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey 314 U.S. 33 (1941)

1962

1941

[W]e conclude that Kesler and Reitz can have no authoritative effect to the extent they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause.

73

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88

1971

Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651

1951

Whether or not Collins v. Hardyman was correctly decided on its own facts is a question with which we need not here be concerned. But it is clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was decided, that many of the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not exist.

74

Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356

1973

Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277

U.S. 389

1928

Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania is only a relic of a bygone era. We cannot follow it and stay within the narrow confines of judicial review, which is an important part of our constitutional tradition.

75

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15

1973

A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs

of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413

1966

The case we now review was tried on the theory that the California Penal Code § 311 approximately incorporates the three-stage Memoirs test ... But now the Memoirs test has been abandoned as unworkable by its author, and no Member of the Court today supports the Memoirs formulation.

76

N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy

v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156

1973

Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105

1928

The Liggett case was a creation at war with the earlier constitutional view of legislative power... and opposed to our more recent decisions... The Liggett case, being a derelict in the stream of the law, is hereby overruled. (Internal citations omitted.)

77

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651

1974

Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights

Org., 409 U.S. 809 (1973); State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972);

Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970) Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)

1973

1972

1970

1969

This case, therefore, is the first opportunity the Court has taken to fully explore and treat the Eleventh Amendment aspects of such relief in a written opinion. Shapiro v. Thompson and these three summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value in support of the contention that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the relief awarded by the District Court in this case. Equally obviously, they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits. Since we deal with a constitutional question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas of the law. Having now had an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings of those cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding today.

78

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522

1975

Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57

1961

Accepting as we do, however, the view that the Sixth Amendment affords the defendant in a criminal trial the opportunity to have the jury drawn from venires representative of the community, we think it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequence is that criminal jury venires are almost totally male. To this extent we cannot follow the contrary implications of the prior cases, including Hoyt v. Florida.

79

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276

1976

Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29

1872

We affirm without addressing the question whether the Georgia Supreme Court was correct in holding that the tires had lost their status as imports. We hold that, in any event, Georgia's assessment of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax against the imported tires is not within the constitutional prohibition against laying "any Imposts or Duties on Imports ..." and that insofar as Low v. Austin ... is to the contrary, that decision is overruled.

80

Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507

1976

Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308

1968

It matters not that some Members of the Court may continue to believe that the Logan Valley case was rightly decided. Our institutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it now is, not as some Members of the Court might wish it to be. And in the performance of that duty we make clear now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd case. Not only did the Lloyd opinion incorporate lengthy excerpts from two of the dissenting opinions in Logan Valley; the ultimate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total rejection of the holding in Logan Valley ... (Internal citations omitted.)

81

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.

Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748

1976

Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52

1942

The appellants contend that the advertisement of prescription drug prices is outside the protection of the First Amendment because it is "commercial speech." There can be no question that in past decisions the Court has given some indication that commercial speech is unprotected. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, ... the Court upheld a New York statute that prohibited the distribution of any "handbill, circular ... or other advertising matter whatsoever in or upon any street." ... Since the decision in Breard, however, the Court has never denied protection on the ground that the speech in issue was "commercial speech."

82

Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

1976

Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183

1968

While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens. We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled.

83

City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297

1976

Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457

1957

Morey is, as appellee and the Court of Appeals properly recognized, essentially indistinguishable from this case, but the decision so far departs from proper equal protection analysis in cases of exclusively economic regulation that it should be, and it is, overruled.

84

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153

1976

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183

1971

While Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly in substantial tension with a broad reading of McGautha's holding. In view of Furman, McGautha can be viewed rationally as a precedent only for the proposition that standardless jury sentencing procedures were not employed in the cases there before the Court so as to violate the Due Process Clause. We note that McGautha's assumption that it is not possible to devise standards to guide and regularize jury sentencing in capital cases has been undermined by subsequent experience. In view of that experience and the considerations set forth in the text, we adhere to Furman's determination that where the ultimate punishment of death is at issue a system of standardless jury discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

85

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190

1976

Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464

1948

Insofar as Goesaert v. Cleary ... may be inconsistent, that decision is disapproved. Undoubtedly reflecting the view that Goesaert's equal protection analysis no longer obtains, the District Court made no reference to that decision in upholding Oklahoma's statute. Similarly, the opinions of the federal and state courts cited earlier in the text invalidating gender lines with respect to alcohol regulation uniformly disparaged the contemporary vitality of Goesaert.

86

Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363

1977

Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313

1973

Upon full reconsideration of our decision in Bonelli, we conclude that it was wrong in treating the equal-footing doctrine as a source of federal common law after that doctrine had vested title to the riverbed in the State of Arizona as of the time of its admission to the Union. We also think there was no other basis in that case, nor is there any in this case, to support the application of federal common law to override state real property law.

87

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186

1977

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714

1978

It would not be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the rationales of Pennoyer and Harris to determine whether jurisdiction might have been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled.

88

Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1

1978

Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950)

1960

1957

1950

Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the only "just" remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal. To the extent that our prior decisions suggest that by moving for a new trial, a defendant waives his right to a judgment of acquittal on the basis of evidentiary insufficiency, those cases are overruled.

89

United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82

1978

United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358

1975

Yet, though our assessment of the history and meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass v. United States ... occurred only three Terms ago, our vastly increased exposure to the various facets of the Double Jeopardy Clause has now convinced us that Jenkins was wrongly decided. It placed an unwarrantedly great emphasis on the defendant's right to have his guilt decided by the first jury empaneled to try him so as to include those cases where the defendant himself seeks to terminate the trial before verdict on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. We have therefore decided to overrule Jenkins ...

90

United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83

1980

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257

1960

Today we hold that defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated. The automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States ... is therefore overruled.

91

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798

1982

Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420

1981

Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in Robbins v. California and with the portion of the opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders on which the plurality in Robbins relied. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this action. Although we have rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in that case; although we reject the precise holding in Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its judgment, and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by the parties in that case.

92

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574

1983

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537

1896

But there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice. Prior to 1954, public education in many places still was conducted under the pall of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); racial segregation in primary and secondary education prevailed in many parts of the country ... This Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), signalled an end to that era.

93

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213

1983

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)

1969

1964

For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged test" established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable-cause determinations.

94

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89

1984

Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120

U.S. 390

1887

The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by Justice Stevens['] dissent today, and asserted that many of the same cases were being overruled or ignored. Those arguments were rejected, and the cases supporting them are moribund. Since Larson was decided in 1949, no opinion by any Member of this Court has cited the cases on which the dissent primarily relies for a proposition as broad as the language the dissent quotes. Many if not most of these cases have not been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context at all.

95

United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354

1984

Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436

1886

Indeed, for nearly a century, the analytical underpinnings of Coffey have been recognized as less than adequate. The time has come to clarify that neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil, remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related criminal charges. To the extent that Coffey v. United States suggests otherwise, it is hereby disapproved.

96

Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466

U.S. 353

1984

Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652

1945

Although Hooven I was not expressly overruled in Michelin, it must be regarded as retaining no vitality since the Michelin decision.... So that there may be no misunderstanding, Hooven I, to the extent it espouses that doctrine, is not to be regarded as authority and is overruled.

97

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528

1985

Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

1976

Our examination of this "function" standard applied in these and other cases over the last eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental function" is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled. (Internal citations omitted).

98

United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130

1985

Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1

1887

To the extent Bain stands for the proposition that it constitutes an unconstitutional amendment to drop from an indictment those allegations that are unnecessary to an offense that is clearly contained within it, that case has simply not survived. To avoid further confusion, we now explicitly reject that proposition.

99

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327

1986

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527

1981

Parratt is overruled to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state official may "deprive" an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.

100

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

1986

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202

1965

To the extent that anything in Swain v. Alabama ... is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is overruled.

101

Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219

1987

Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.)

66

1861

Kentucky v. Dennison is the product of another time. The conception of the relation between the States and the Federal Government there announced is fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development.... We conclude that it may stand no longer.

102

Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435

1987

O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258

1969

This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U. C. M. J.) to try a member of the Armed Forces depends on the "service connection" of the offense charged. We hold that it does not, and overrule our earlier decision in O'Callahan v. Parker ...

103

Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468

1987

Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184

1964

Accordingly, to the extent that Parden v. Terminal Railway ... is inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled.

104

South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505

1988

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429

1895

We thus confirm that subsequent case law has overruled the holding in Pollock that state bond interest is immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax.

105

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401

1989

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396

1974

Any attempt to justify a similar categorical distinction between incoming correspondence from prisoners (to which we applied a reasonableness standard in Turner) and incoming correspondence from nonprisoners would likely prove futile, and we do not invite it. To the extent that Martinez itself suggests such a distinction, we today overrule that case; the Court accomplished much of this step when it decided Turner.

106

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794

1989

Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 (decided with North Caroline v. Pearce)

1969

Believing, as we do, that there is no basis for a presumption of vindictiveness where a second sentence imposed after a trial is heavier than a first sentence imposed after a guilty plea, we overrule Simpson v. Rice ... to that extent.

107

Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37

1990

Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883)

1898

1883

The holding in Kring can only be justified if the Ex Post Facto Clause is thought to include not merely the Calder categories, but any change which "alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage." We think such a reading of the Clause departs from the meaning of the Clause as it was understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and is not supported by later cases. We accordingly overrule Kring ...

The Court's holding in Thompson v. Utah that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury panel of 12 persons is also obsolete. (Internal citations omitted.)

108

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565

1991

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753

1979

Although we have recognized firmly that the doctrine of stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes in our legal system, this Court has overruled a prior case on the comparatively rare occasion when it has bred confusion or been a derelict or led to anomalous results. Sanders was explicitly undermined in Ross, and the existence of the dual regimes for automobile searches that uncover containers has proved as confusing as the Chadwick and Sanders dissenters predicted. We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders. (Internal citations omitted)

109

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808

1991

South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)

1989

1987

Booth and Gathers were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions. They have been questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions and have defied consistent application by the lower courts. Reconsidering these decisions now, we conclude, for the reasons heretofore stated, that they were wrongly decided and should be, and now are, overruled. (internal citations omitted)

110

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298

1992

Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753

1967

[I]n Bellas Hess the Court suggested that [physical] presence was not only sufficient for jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, but also necessary ... Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.

111

Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833

1992

Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.

Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)

1986

1983

Although we must overrule those parts of Thornburgh and Akron I which, in our view, are inconsistent with Roe's statement that the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn the central premise of those cases represents an unbroken commitment by this Court to the essential holding of Roe. (Internal citations omitted.)

112

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688

1993

Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508

1990

We have concluded, however, that Grady must be overruled.

113

Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738

1994

Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222

1980

Today we adhere to Scott v. Illinois ... and overrule Baldasar. Accordingly we hold, consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction.

114

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200

1995

Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547

1990

[W]e hold today that racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. To the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled.

115

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506

1995

Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263

1929

And we think stare decisis cannot possibly be controlling when, in addition to those factors, the decision in question has been proved manifestly erroneous, and its underpinnings eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court.

116

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44

1996

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1

1989

In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.

117

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,

517 U.S. 484

1996

California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109

1972

Without questioning the holding in LaRue, we now disavow its reasoning insofar as it relied on the Twenty-first Amendment.

118

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203

1997

Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)

1985

1985

We therefore overrule Ball and Aguilar to the extent those decisions are inconsistent with our current understanding of the Establishment Clause.

119

Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93

1997

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435

1989

We believe that Halper's deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles was ill considered. As subsequent cases have demonstrated, Halper's test for determining whether a particular sanction is "punitive," and thus subject to the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause, has proved unworkable.

120

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172

1999

Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504

1896

Race Horse rested on the premise that treaty rights are irreconcilable with state sovereignty. It is this conclusion—the conclusion undergirding the Race Horse Court's equal footing holding—that we have consistently rejected over the years.

121

Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense

Bd., 527 U.S. 666

1999

Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184

1964

We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it. As we explain below in detail, Parden broke sharply with prior cases, and is fundamentally incompatible with later ones.... In short, Parden stands as an anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and indeed in the jurisprudence of constitutional law. Today, we drop the other shoe: Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.

122

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793

2000

Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)

1977

1975

Accordingly, we hold that Chapter 2 is not a law respecting an establishment of religion. Jefferson Parish need not exclude religious schools from its Chapter 2 program. To the extent that Meek and Wolman conflict with this holding, we overrule them.

123

United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557

2001

Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245

1920

We now overrule Evans insofar as it holds that the Compensation Clause forbids Congress to apply a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax to the salaries of federal judges, whether or not they were appointed before enactment of the tax.

124

Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 535 U.S. 613

2002

Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of State of Ind., 323 U.S. 459

1945

[F]or these same reasons, we conclude that Clark, Gunter, and Gardner represent the sounder line of authority. Finding Ford inconsistent with the basic rationale of that line of cases, we consequently overrule Ford insofar as it would otherwise apply.

125

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625

2002

Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1

1887

Insofar as it held that a defective indictment deprives a court of jurisdiction, Bain is overruled.

126

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

2002

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302

1989

Much has changed since then.... The practice, therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.

127

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

2002

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639

1990

Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.

128

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558

2003

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186

1986

Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.

129

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36

2004

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56

1980

Roberts' failings were on full display in the proceedings below ...

130

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551

2005

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361

1989

These considerations mean Stanford v. Kentucky should be deemed no longer controlling on this issue. To the extent Stanford was based on review of the objective indicia of consensus that obtained in 1989, it suffices to note that those indicia have changed ... It is also inconsistent with the premises of our recent decision in Atkins. (Internal citations omitted)

131

Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356

2006

Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96

1989

We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996), reflected an assumption that the holding in that case would apply to the Bankruptcy Clause. See also Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 105, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 106 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1989) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Careful study and reflection have convinced us, however, that that assumption was erroneous.

132

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223

2009

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194

2001

On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.

133

Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778

2009

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625

1986

In sum, when the marginal benefits of the Jackson rule are weighed against its substantial costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal justice system, we readily conclude that the rule does not "pay its way," ... Michigan v. Jackson should be and now is overruled. (Internal citations omitted).

134

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310

2010

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93

2003

Given our conclusion we are further required to overrule the part of McConnell that upheld [the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act] § 203's extension of § 441b's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures. The McConnell Court relied on the antidistortion interest recognized in Austin to uphold a greater restriction on speech than the restriction upheld in Austin, and we have found this interest unconvincing and insufficient. This part of McConnell is now overruled. (Internal citations omitted)

135

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, No. 11–9335, slip op.

2013

Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545

2002

Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, Harris is overruled.

136

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, No. 14–556, slip op.

2015

Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810

1972

Baker v. Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State laws challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.

137

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S.

___, No. 13–7120, slip op.

2015

Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1; James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192

2011

2007

We hold that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process. Our contrary holdings in James and Sykes are overruled.

138

Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. ___, No.

14–7505, slip op.

2016

Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (per curiam); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447

1989

1984

Spaziano and Hildwin summarized earlier precedent to conclude that "the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury." Their conclusion was wrong, and irreconcilable with Apprendi. (Internal citations omitted).

139

South Dakota v. Wayfair, 585 U.S. ___, No. 17-494, slip op.

2018

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298; Nat'l Bella Hess v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753

1992

1967

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and incorrect. The Court's decisions in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota and National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill. should be, and now are, overruled. (Internal citations omitted).

140

Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___, No. 17-695, slip op.

2018

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214

1944

The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—"has no place in law under the Constitution." (Citation omitted).

141

Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, County, & Munic. Emps., 585 U.S. ___, No. 16-1466, slip op.

2018

Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 U.S. 209

1977

All these reasons—that Abood's proponents have abandoned its reasoning, that the precedent has proved unworkable, that it conflicts with other First Amendment decisions, and that subsequent developments have eroded its underpinnings—provide the "special justification[s]" for overruling Abood. (Citation omitted).

Source: CRS.

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